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The expression autonomous agents, widely 
used in virtual reality !! "#$%&'()$*'(#%+)',-).#$%&'()
*,.#$/,0*,%1, computer graphics !! 2/03&%*$)
4$'35#671, artificial intelligence and artificial 
life, corresponds to the simulation of au-
tonomous creatures, virtual (i.e. totally com-
puted by a program), or embodied in a 
physical envelope, as done in autonomous 
robots. 
Intelligent characters !! 8,%*((#4*,%) 65'$'6%*$71 
are a specific category of autonomous agents. 
The distinction between both comes from 
the difference between intelligence and au-
tonomy, these two concepts being not syn-
onymous. 
Strictly speaking, autonomous and agent 
are redundant, in the sense that the basic 
definition of an agent is “an autonomous 
adaptive entity”, having the following basic 
properties: 
- Able to satisfy goals in a complex envi-
ronment; 
- Autonomous: able to do so by itself, i.e. 
without any external help, by controlling 
its actions and its internal states; 
- Adaptive: able to improve its performance. 
As a remark, autonomy is sometimes re-
strictively identified with the capability of 
perceiving the environment through sensors 
and act on it through effectors. By adding 
others properties to these three basic ones, 
especially the following, the autonomous 
agent goes toward the status of intelligent 
creature (or intelligent agent, or intelligent 
character): 
- Social: interacting with other agents 
through a language ; 
- Pro-active: able to define its own goals by 
itself; 
- Able to learn: as an improvement of adap-
tive capabilities. 
Two main types of autonomous agents are 
usually confronted, based on two different 
approaches on the nature of the autonomy: 
(1) Deliberative agents, cognitive agents, rule-
based agents; and (2) Reactive agents or 
stimulus/reaction–based agents. 
Deliberative agents, cognitive agents, 
rule-based agents 
Such agents lead to the Symbolic Artificial 
Intelligence paradigm, as founded by the 
Newell and Simon’s concept of symbol 
system [Newell & Simon, 1976]. They con-
tain an explicit symbolic representation of the 
world, on the basis of which decisions are 
taken by logical symbolic reasoning. One of 
the most relevant implementation of this type 
of agent is the Believe-Desire-Intention of 
Rao [Rao & Georgeff, 1991]. 
The main difficulties on such approaches 
are: 
- The need of a completeness of the system 
of rules 
- The lack of reactivity, directly linked to the 
number of rules 
- The maintaining of the coherence of the 
rules systems during their evolution 
Reactive agents, stimulus/reaction–
based agents 
Such agents are able to exhibit autono-
mous behaviours without any explicit sym-
bolic representation nor abstract reasoning. 
Well-known implementations of those are 
Brooks’ robots [Brooks, 1991]. They are 
deterministic and passive systems, but they 
are not capable of defining their own goals 
and long lasting planning. 
The software and hardware architecture 
implementing such concepts are called be-
haviour-based architectures. They are com-
posed of modular behavioural blocks and 
perception-decision-action processes. Many 
hardware and software architectures have 
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been proposed. The main three are based 
either on artificial neural networks, finite 
state automata, or logical rules systems. 
Basic underlying assumptions 
Each of these approaches are grounded on 
specific hypothesis and philosophical enlight-
ening on what are intelligence, autonomy, 
living organisms. Let us sum up some of the 
main assumptions. 
- The principle of modularity. 
Modularity is the principle according to 
which autonomous behaviours may emerge 
from a large collection of interacting simple 
and specialized behaviours. It corresponds to 
the ant paradigm, implementing the Taylor-
ism organisation of labour, based on division 
of labour according to predefined task spe-
cializations. 
- A modelling inspired by neural biological 
systems. 
Especially, artificial neural networks, or 
finite state automata networks, are con-
sidered to model neural biological systems. 
These approaches are close to non-
representationalist cognitive approaches. The 
behaviours emerge from the network struc-
ture. In neural networks, the data processed 
are “bits” (i.e. representing logical states) 
while in finite state automata networks, they 
can be real and integers (i.e. representing 
analogical states). 
- A pure logical interpretation of decisional 
and reasoning capabilities. 
Especially, logical rules systems are usually 
used, based on deduction and inference 
processes, which are at a high level of ab-
straction [Jennings, 2000]. This approach is 
directly inspired by the computational theory 
of mind !! 2/03&%'%#/,'()3'$'-#401. The percep-
tion-decision-action process, supposed to be 
inspired by processes observed in human, is 
often implemented as a basic functionality. 
The main difficulty of this approach when 
implementing artificial creatures is that the 
specification of a complex performed behav-
iour is unwieldy because of a few numbers of 
rules compatible with a reasonable time of 
computation, and thus the method is strongly 
confronted to the automation of the creation 
of the rules, and thus it strongly depends on 
learning level. 
Role of autonomous agents in enaction 
and enactive interfaces 
The mediations between humans and 
world through computerized representations 
can be split in five categories of interaction: 
- Physical interaction between real human 
and the real physical world (such as is tel-
eoperation). 
- Physical interaction between real human 
and a virtual physical world. 
- Symbolic or physical interaction between 
real humans and virtual agents. 
- Interaction between real humans and the 
real physical world through virtual physical 
objects. 
- Interaction between real humans and the 
real physical world through virtual agents. 
Consequently, the assumptions on the na-
ture of virtual autonomous agents as well as 
of the nature of real autonomous agent, 
intervene directly in the enactivity of the 
interaction: 
- between real human and the real physical 
world through virtual agents; 
- and between real humans and virtual 
agents. 
This enables implementing situations from 
those that absolutely non-enactive (as those 
based on computational theory of mind for 
both interacting bodies) to those that are very 
close to the enaction paradigm (as those 
based on automaton networks). 
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